A weakly preferred mediator in a market-share-maximizing routing market can force a monopoly equilibrium, even when rivals try to attract users with better routes.
(2024).Algorithmic pricing and competition: Empirical evidence from the German retail gasoline market.Journal of Political Economy, 132(3), 723-771
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Competitive mediator games and urban CAV routing markets
A weakly preferred mediator in a market-share-maximizing routing market can force a monopoly equilibrium, even when rivals try to attract users with better routes.