Imperfect commitment in MEV auctions creates piecewise equilibria where searchers mix risky and safe bids, with empirical decomposition revealing high replicability exposure in naked arbitrage and liquidations but low exposure in sandwiches.
Analysis of the Order Flow Auction under Proposer-Builder Separation on Blockchain.arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.120262025
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
2
Pith papers citing it
citation-role summary
background 1
citation-polarity summary
years
2026 2roles
background 1polarities
background 1representative citing papers
The paper delivers a systematization of knowledge on AI agent-blockchain interactions via a bidirectional trust framework, an Agent-Blockchain Interaction Model, a five-dimensional evaluation lens, and nine identified open problems.
citing papers explorer
-
Imperfect Commitment in Maximal Extractable Value Auctions
Imperfect commitment in MEV auctions creates piecewise equilibria where searchers mix risky and safe bids, with empirical decomposition revealing high replicability exposure in naked arbitrage and liquidations but low exposure in sandwiches.
-
Toward Web 4.0: Bidirectional Trust between AI Agents and Blockchain
The paper delivers a systematization of knowledge on AI agent-blockchain interactions via a bidirectional trust framework, an Agent-Blockchain Interaction Model, a five-dimensional evaluation lens, and nine identified open problems.