Models human-AI delegation as a decision process that scales to collective equilibria, identifying sociotechnical lock-in as a prisoner's dilemma that degrades epistemic standards absent communicative and institutional safeguards.
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Non-affine approval functions create unavoidable miscalibration in proper scoring rules for strategic agents, but step-function thresholds enable first-best screening without it, uniquely for the Brier score.
citing papers explorer
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The Human-AI Delegation Dilemma: Individual Strategies, Collective Equilibria and Sociotechnical Lock-in
Models human-AI delegation as a decision process that scales to collective equilibria, identifying sociotechnical lock-in as a prisoner's dilemma that degrades epistemic standards absent communicative and institutional safeguards.
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The Endogeneity of Miscalibration: Impossibility and Escape in Scored Reporting
Non-affine approval functions create unavoidable miscalibration in proper scoring rules for strategic agents, but step-function thresholds enable first-best screening without it, uniquely for the Brier score.