The paper introduces a game-theoretic model and the FPA-EQ fee mechanism for multi-proposer blockchains, with a tight 63.2% welfare guarantee and matching impossibility results.
In: Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)
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Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols
The paper introduces a game-theoretic model and the FPA-EQ fee mechanism for multi-proposer blockchains, with a tight 63.2% welfare guarantee and matching impossibility results.