A mean field game model of epidemic control derives forward-backward ODEs for Nash equilibria with at-most one-jump bang-bang vaccination rates, proves solution existence, and uses simulations to highlight the value of quarantining infected individuals.
On the optimal vaccination control of sir model with erlang- distributed infectious period
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Modeling Epidemic Spread with Strategic Vaccination and Socialization: a Mean Field Game Analysis
A mean field game model of epidemic control derives forward-backward ODEs for Nash equilibria with at-most one-jump bang-bang vaccination rates, proves solution existence, and uses simulations to highlight the value of quarantining infected individuals.