Develops infinite-horizon stationary robust mean-field games incorporating distributional uncertainty, proves equilibrium existence via fixed-point on contractive Bellman operator, gives convergent algorithm, and derives finite-population approximation bounds under contractive regime.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.13888 , year=
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
2
Pith papers citing it
citation-role summary
background 1
citation-polarity summary
roles
background 1polarities
background 1representative citing papers
A comprehensive benchmark study of offline imitation learning methods on multi-stage robot manipulation tasks identifies key sensitivities to algorithm design, data quality, and stopping criteria while releasing all datasets and code.
citing papers explorer
-
Stationary Robust Mean-Field Games under Model Mismatches
Develops infinite-horizon stationary robust mean-field games incorporating distributional uncertainty, proves equilibrium existence via fixed-point on contractive Bellman operator, gives convergent algorithm, and derives finite-population approximation bounds under contractive regime.
-
What Matters in Learning from Offline Human Demonstrations for Robot Manipulation
A comprehensive benchmark study of offline imitation learning methods on multi-stage robot manipulation tasks identifies key sensitivities to algorithm design, data quality, and stopping criteria while releasing all datasets and code.