Enforcing proportional representation in temporal voting incurs sublinear welfare loss that vanishes asymptotically for JR but persists for stronger axioms, with NP-complete and APX-hard welfare maximization even under static preferences.
Completing priceable committees: utilitarian and repre- sentation guarantees for proportional multiwinner voting
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The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting
Enforcing proportional representation in temporal voting incurs sublinear welfare loss that vanishes asymptotically for JR but persists for stronger axioms, with NP-complete and APX-hard welfare maximization even under static preferences.