Strong randomized mean-field equilibria exist for optimal-stopping games with countably generated common noise under continuity assumptions, and monotone comparative statics hold for strict equilibria.
A mean-field version of Bank-El Karoui's representation of stochastic processes
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abstract
We study a mean-field version of Bank-El Karoui's representation theorem of stochastic processes. Under different technical conditions, we establish some existence and uniqueness results. As motivation and first applications, our mean-field representation results provide a unified approach to study different Mean-Field Games (MFGs) in the setting with common noise and multiple populations, including the MFG of timing, the MFG with singular control, etc. As a crucial technical step, we provide a stability result on the classical Bank-El Karoui's representation theorem, which has its own interests and other applications, such as in deriving stability results of the optimizers (in the strong sense) for a class of optimal stopping problems and singular control problems.
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Existence of Strong Randomized Equilibria in Mean-Field Games of Optimal Stopping with Common Noise
Strong randomized mean-field equilibria exist for optimal-stopping games with countably generated common noise under continuity assumptions, and monotone comparative statics hold for strict equilibria.