Logistic QRE of extensive-form games is characterized as Nash equilibria of a dilated-entropy-barrier artificial game in sequence form, enabling differentiable path-following that selects Nash equilibria.
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2 Pith papers cite this work, alongside 18 external citations. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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A single-stage differentiable interior-point path-following method computes Nash equilibria directly from the sequence-form representation of perfect-recall extensive games.
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A Sequence-Form Formulation of Logistic Quantal Response Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games for Selecting Nash Equilibria
Logistic QRE of extensive-form games is characterized as Nash equilibria of a dilated-entropy-barrier artificial game in sequence form, enabling differentiable path-following that selects Nash equilibria.
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Two Sequence-Form Interior-Point Differentiable Path-Following Method to Compute Nash Equilibria
A single-stage differentiable interior-point path-following method computes Nash equilibria directly from the sequence-form representation of perfect-recall extensive games.