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Thus, we can write the produceri’s payoff as follows: Ui(q,µ −i,p) =R i(q,µ −i,p)−c(q) =E    X i∈[n] 1{I=i}   −c(q)   =  X i∈[n] Pr [ Provideri’s content is recommended to useri]   −c(q) = nX i=1 pi n−1 i−1 F(q) n−i(1−F(q)) i−1 · 2024

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cs.GT 1

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2026 1

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Optimal Contest Beyond Convexity

cs.GT · 2026-04-06 · unverdicted · novelty 7.0

For nonconvex objectives in multi-contestant design, the optimal prize allocation takes the form p1 ≥ p2 = ⋯ = p_{n-1} ≥ pn = 0 and admits an FPTAS via value oracle.

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  • Optimal Contest Beyond Convexity cs.GT · 2026-04-06 · unverdicted · none · ref 2

    For nonconvex objectives in multi-contestant design, the optimal prize allocation takes the form p1 ≥ p2 = ⋯ = p_{n-1} ≥ pn = 0 and admits an FPTAS via value oracle.