In a coordination game with switching costs and logit quantal response, endogenous hard transformations (action deletion) eliminate inertia better than soft ones (taxes), while meta-level antagonistic social preferences can block individually Pareto-improving reforms.
Deception through telling the truth?! experimental evidence from individuals and teams.Economic Journal, 119(534):47–60
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Why Efficient Reforms Fail: Endogenous Game Transformation under Status Quo Bias and Social Preferences
In a coordination game with switching costs and logit quantal response, endogenous hard transformations (action deletion) eliminate inertia better than soft ones (taxes), while meta-level antagonistic social preferences can block individually Pareto-improving reforms.