In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with trigger-restart, longer strategy lengths enable stability of cooperative strategies under replicator dynamics, with stable sequences requiring an initial 'hazing period' of defection and longer such periods having larger basins of attraction.
In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
fields
cs.GT 1years
2026 1verdicts
UNVERDICTED 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Convergence of Replicator Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Restarts
In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with trigger-restart, longer strategy lengths enable stability of cooperative strategies under replicator dynamics, with stable sequences requiring an initial 'hazing period' of defection and longer such periods having larger basins of attraction.