Best response dynamics in partially observed zero-sum linear quadratic games converge numerically after a few iterations, and low-order belief feedback strategies approximate the Nash equilibrium.
Least squares stationary optimal control and the algebraic Riccati equation,
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Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information
Best response dynamics in partially observed zero-sum linear quadratic games converge numerically after a few iterations, and low-order belief feedback strategies approximate the Nash equilibrium.