In repeated Sender-Receiver interactions with misaligned incentives, agents learn communication strategies and linear contracts, enabling the Sender to improve its rewards while reducing fairness by extracting much of the Receiver's surplus.
Salani´ e.The Economics of Contracts: A Primer
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Information and Contract Design for Repeated Interactions between Agents with Misaligned Incentives
In repeated Sender-Receiver interactions with misaligned incentives, agents learn communication strategies and linear contracts, enabling the Sender to improve its rewards while reducing fairness by extracting much of the Receiver's surplus.