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Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles

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abstract

We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph. If the graph is a path and the utility functions are monotonic over bundles, we show the existence of EF1 allocations for at most four agents, and the existence of EF2 allocations for any number of agents; our proofs involve discrete analogues of the Stromquist's moving-knife protocol and the Su--Simmons argument based on Sperner's lemma. For identical utilities, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an EF1 allocation for any number of agents. For the case of two agents, we characterize the class of graphs that guarantee the existence of EF1 allocations as those whose biconnected components are arranged in a path; this property can be checked in linear time.

fields

cs.GT 1

years

2019 1

verdicts

ACCEPT 1

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The Price of Connectivity in Fair Division

cs.GT · 2019-08-15 · accept · novelty 8.0

The price of connectivity, the worst-case ratio between the best connected fairness guarantee and the unconstrained one, is 1/k for graphs with a cut vertex that splits into k pieces, at least 3/4 for biconnected graphs with two agents, and 1/(m−n+1) for paths and stars.

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  • The Price of Connectivity in Fair Division cs.GT · 2019-08-15 · accept · none · ref 7 · internal anchor

    The price of connectivity, the worst-case ratio between the best connected fairness guarantee and the unconstrained one, is 1/k for graphs with a cut vertex that splits into k pieces, at least 3/4 for biconnected graphs with two agents, and 1/(m−n+1) for paths and stars.