A philosopher's introduction compares three multiverse proposals and tentatively concludes 'Yes, No and Maybe': a non-Lewisian philosophical multiverse is believable, the Everettian multiverse is not, and the cosmological multiverse is genuinely uncertain.
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Bayesian probability theory is used to analyze the oft-made assumption that humans are typical observers in the universe. Some theoretical calculations make the {\it selection fallacy} that we are randomly chosen from a class of objects by some physical process, despite the absence of any evidence for such a process, or any observational evidence favoring our typicality. It is possible to favor theories in which we are typical by appropriately choosing their prior probabilities, but such assumptions should be made explicit to avoid confusion.
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The Multiverse: a Philosophical Introduction
A philosopher's introduction compares three multiverse proposals and tentatively concludes 'Yes, No and Maybe': a non-Lewisian philosophical multiverse is believable, the Everettian multiverse is not, and the cosmological multiverse is genuinely uncertain.