In constrained multi-unit auctions, Myerson-style mechanisms are optimal for revenue-aligned objectives while buyer constraints enable strictly better outcomes for consumer-aligned objectives.
Title resolution pending
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
2
Pith papers citing it
fields
cs.GT 2years
2026 2verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
Anonymous pricing guarantees 1/e of optimal revenue for mixed value and utility maximizers, improves prior bounds, and shows competition can reduce revenue.
citing papers explorer
-
Optimal Auctions for Constrained Buyers
In constrained multi-unit auctions, Myerson-style mechanisms are optimal for revenue-aligned objectives while buyer constraints enable strictly better outcomes for consumer-aligned objectives.
-
Revenue Guarantee of Anonymous Pricing for Mixed Bidders:Bridging Value and Utility Maximizers
Anonymous pricing guarantees 1/e of optimal revenue for mixed value and utility maximizers, improves prior bounds, and shows competition can reduce revenue.