Kuhn's Theorem is extended to games with unawareness: mixed and behavior strategies are equivalent under perfect recall plus constant awareness along paths and a no-false-belief condition; the converse fails without those restrictions.
Schipper (2021)
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Pith papers citing it
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UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
Defines generalized normal form for dynamic games with unawareness and characterizes extensive-form rationalizability by iterated conditional strict dominance in that form.
citing papers explorer
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Kuhn's Theorem for Games of the Extensive Form with Unawareness
Kuhn's Theorem is extended to games with unawareness: mixed and behavior strategies are equivalent under perfect recall plus constant awareness along paths and a no-false-belief condition; the converse fails without those restrictions.
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Conditional dominance in games with unawareness
Defines generalized normal form for dynamic games with unawareness and characterizes extensive-form rationalizability by iterated conditional strict dominance in that form.