Higher precision in noisy screening signals can reduce decision accuracy by prompting increased strategic mimicry from low-quality agents.
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Public messaging weakly dominates private messaging for implementing collective project decisions and is strictly dominant in linear-payoff settings with two conflicting allies.
citing papers explorer
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Pitfall of Precision in Noisy Signaling
Higher precision in noisy screening signals can reduce decision accuracy by prompting increased strategic mimicry from low-quality agents.
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Going Public: Communication in Collective Decisions
Public messaging weakly dominates private messaging for implementing collective project decisions and is strictly dominant in linear-payoff settings with two conflicting allies.