Context-ordinal Nash equilibria are defined via social choice aggregation of ordinal preferences, shown to exist under mild conditions, with regularization, approximation, regret notions, complexity results, and learning rules developed.
Flows and decomposi- tions of games: Harmonic and potential games.Mathematics of Operations Research, 36(3): 474–503
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Nash without Numbers: A Social Choice Approach to Mixed Equilibria in Context-Ordinal Games
Context-ordinal Nash equilibria are defined via social choice aggregation of ordinal preferences, shown to exist under mild conditions, with regularization, approximation, regret notions, complexity results, and learning rules developed.