Deciding whether a correlated equilibrium with welfare above a threshold exists is PSPACE-hard for NFCE and NP-complete for EFCE, AFCE, EFCCE, NFCCE, and AFCCE in multiplayer extensive-form games; Nash threshold is ∃R-complete.
A catalog of exists-r-complete decision problems about nash equilibria in multi-player games
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On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
Deciding whether a correlated equilibrium with welfare above a threshold exists is PSPACE-hard for NFCE and NP-complete for EFCE, AFCE, EFCCE, NFCCE, and AFCCE in multiplayer extensive-form games; Nash threshold is ∃R-complete.