The paper provides a unified ascending auction framework via discrete convex analysis to compute buyer-optimal Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets with strong substitutes valuations and piecewise-linear payment frictions.
Then, the desired direction isd 1 = (0.5,0.125) from Theorem 4.4
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Ascending Auctions for Combinatorial Markets with Frictions: A Unified Framework via Discrete Convex Analysis
The paper provides a unified ascending auction framework via discrete convex analysis to compute buyer-optimal Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets with strong substitutes valuations and piecewise-linear payment frictions.