In a simulated multi-round ascending takeover auction, toeholds raise the holder's profit but the deterrence channel they are supposed to provide disappears once the contest lasts more than one round.
Deep reinforcement learning from self-play in imperfect-information games
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Does a Toehold Make a Bidder Bolder? Preemption and Multiplicity in Multi-Round Takeover Auctions
In a simulated multi-round ascending takeover auction, toeholds raise the holder's profit but the deterrence channel they are supposed to provide disappears once the contest lasts more than one round.