A two-universal QKD hashing protocol is claimed to be 2^{−k/2 + n h_2(r/n) + 35/4 + log_2√C}-secure for an unspecified constant C — a strictly weaker bound than Ostrev's 2^{−k/2 + n h(r/n) + 5/2}, obtained by adapting Ostrev's proof with 'real/simulator/ideal isometries'.
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Probability distributions over CSS codes: two-universality, QKD hashing, collision bounds, security
A two-universal QKD hashing protocol is claimed to be 2^{−k/2 + n h_2(r/n) + 35/4 + log_2√C}-secure for an unspecified constant C — a strictly weaker bound than Ostrev's 2^{−k/2 + n h(r/n) + 5/2}, obtained by adapting Ostrev's proof with 'real/simulator/ideal isometries'.