Presents an algorithm-to-contract framework that lifts FPTASes to approximately incentive-compatible contracts for budgeted combinatorial problems without demand oracles, applying to matroids, matchings, and multi-agent non-additive rewards.
Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: Bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
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An Algorithm-to-Contract Framework without Demand Queries
Presents an algorithm-to-contract framework that lifts FPTASes to approximately incentive-compatible contracts for budgeted combinatorial problems without demand oracles, applying to matroids, matchings, and multi-agent non-additive rewards.