In dynamic Stackelberg games with mid-game belief updates, assuming an incorrect follower best-response model can yield strictly lower leader cost than knowing the true model.
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Incentive conditions for under-collateralized credit in non-custodial micropayments are characterized via repeated game models with bounded exposure, verifiable settlements, and continuation value.
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When the Correct Model Fails: The Optimality of Stackelberg Equilibria with Follower Intention Updates
In dynamic Stackelberg games with mid-game belief updates, assuming an incorrect follower best-response model can yield strictly lower leader cost than knowing the true model.
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Credit Limits beyond Full Collateralization in Decentralized Micropayments: Incentive Conditions
Incentive conditions for under-collateralized credit in non-custodial micropayments are characterized via repeated game models with bounded exposure, verifiable settlements, and continuation value.