Introduces the first compositional game-theoretic framework for blockchains using cross-layer games and cross-application composition to analyze incentive compatibility and reveal vulnerabilities in composed systems.
[BV25] Isaac Baley and Laura L
3 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
3
Pith papers citing it
fields
cs.GT 3representative citing papers
Revenue maximization for pricing datasets to budget-constrained buyers is APX-hard, with a 2-approximation for online arrivals and a (1-1/e)^{-1}-approximation for offline.
Recursive information markets with forgetful LLM buyers can align information prices with true value and extend to scalable oversight in AI alignment.
citing papers explorer
-
A Composable Game-Theoretic Framework for Blockchains
Introduces the first compositional game-theoretic framework for blockchains using cross-layer games and cross-application composition to analyze incentive compatibility and reveal vulnerabilities in composed systems.
-
Revenue-Optimal Pricing for Budget-Constrained Buyers in Data Markets
Revenue maximization for pricing datasets to budget-constrained buyers is APX-hard, with a 2-approximation for online arrivals and a (1-1/e)^{-1}-approximation for offline.
-
Extrapolating Volition with Recursive Information Markets
Recursive information markets with forgetful LLM buyers can align information prices with true value and extend to scalable oversight in AI alignment.