Systematic review of thirteen malicious-code prompt corpora for coding LLM refusal evaluation that catalogs construction methods, surfaces gaps in human baselines, cross-corpus comparability, and malware taxonomies, and proposes methodological improvements.
Secodeplt: A unified platform for evaluating the security of code genai.arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.11096
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MOSAIC-Bench demonstrates that nine production coding agents achieve 53-86% end-to-end attack success rates on staged innocuous tickets across 10 web substrates and 31 CWE classes, far higher than the 0-20.4% rates seen with direct prompts.
The paper releases a 1,554-prompt consensus-labeled bank separating executable malicious code requests from security knowledge requests, validated by five-model majority labeling with Fleiss' kappa of 0.876.
citing papers explorer
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Refusal Evaluation in Coding LLMs and Code Agents: A Systematic Review of Thirteen Malicious-Code Prompt Corpora (2023-2025)
Systematic review of thirteen malicious-code prompt corpora for coding LLM refusal evaluation that catalogs construction methods, surfaces gaps in human baselines, cross-corpus comparability, and malware taxonomies, and proposes methodological improvements.
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MOSAIC-Bench: Measuring Compositional Vulnerability Induction in Coding Agents
MOSAIC-Bench demonstrates that nine production coding agents achieve 53-86% end-to-end attack success rates on staged innocuous tickets across 10 web substrates and 31 CWE classes, far higher than the 0-20.4% rates seen with direct prompts.
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A Validated Prompt Bank for Malicious Code Generation: Separating Executable Weapons from Security Knowledge in 1,554 Consensus-Labeled Prompts
The paper releases a 1,554-prompt consensus-labeled bank separating executable malicious code requests from security knowledge requests, validated by five-model majority labeling with Fleiss' kappa of 0.876.