Evolutionary game theoretic model demonstrates generic bistability in health AI adoption with a stable partial adoption equilibrium enlarged by coordination failure, trust erosion, and negative cultural norms, producing a Value-Adoption Paradox.
Evolutionary games on graphs
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Simulations show that cooperative outcomes in network games with personality-driven LLM agents depend on both network connectivity and the placement of pro-social personalities, not just pairwise interaction preferences.
In spatial public goods games on lattices, allowing agents to reevaluate and change interaction groups promotes cooperation emergence, while high rates of group switching suppress it.
citing papers explorer
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The partial adoption trap: Coordination failure, trust, and cultural lock-in in health AI adoption
Evolutionary game theoretic model demonstrates generic bistability in health AI adoption with a stable partial adoption equilibrium enlarged by coordination failure, trust erosion, and negative cultural norms, producing a Value-Adoption Paradox.
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NetworkGames: Simulating Cooperation in Network Games with Personality-driven LLM Agents
Simulations show that cooperative outcomes in network games with personality-driven LLM agents depend on both network connectivity and the placement of pro-social personalities, not just pairwise interaction preferences.
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Cooperation in public goods game on square lattices with agents changing interaction groups
In spatial public goods games on lattices, allowing agents to reevaluate and change interaction groups promotes cooperation emergence, while high rates of group switching suppress it.