A delayed, angle-estimation based LinUCB algorithm achieves \tilde O(sqrt T) strategic regret in a generalized principal-agent model with private types and non-myopic agents.
Proof of Theorem B.1.We defer the proof of the theorem to Appendix C.6
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Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark
A delayed, angle-estimation based LinUCB algorithm achieves \tilde O(sqrt T) strategic regret in a generalized principal-agent model with private types and non-myopic agents.