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Jon Feldman, Vahab S

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cs.GT 1

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2026 1

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Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary

cs.GT · 2026-05-21 · unverdicted · novelty 7.0

In the seller-first timing model, deterministic seller mechanisms reduce to posted prices while the intermediary best-responds with a shifted Myerson auction, yielding arbitrarily poor seller revenue for regular distributions but constant-factor recovery for alpha-strongly regular ones, with timing,

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  • Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary cs.GT · 2026-05-21 · unverdicted · none · ref 27

    In the seller-first timing model, deterministic seller mechanisms reduce to posted prices while the intermediary best-responds with a shifted Myerson auction, yielding arbitrarily poor seller revenue for regular distributions but constant-factor recovery for alpha-strongly regular ones, with timing,