A trained attack model generates single emails that silently inject false memories into persistent AI agents, achieving 87.5% end-to-end success on GPT-5.4 and transferring across architectures and memory backends.
Clawdrain: Exploiting tool-calling chains for stealthy token exhaustion in OpenClaw agents
9 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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citation-polarity summary
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2026 9roles
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DeepTrap automates discovery of contextual vulnerabilities in OpenClaw agents via trajectory optimization, showing that unsafe behavior can be induced while preserving task completion and that final-response checks are insufficient.
Routine user chats can unintentionally poison the long-term state of personalized LLM agents, causing authorization drift, tool escalation, and unchecked autonomy, as measured by a new benchmark and reduced by the StateGuard defense.
Claw AI agents' heartbeat background execution shares memory context with user sessions, allowing ordinary social misinformation to silently pollute long-term memory and shape behavior at rates up to 76% across sessions.
BraveGuard trains guard models on realistic agent trajectories derived from open-world threats, raising detection accuracy on AgentHazard from 38.79% to 82.38%.
The survey organizes security threats and defenses in autonomous LLM agents into four layers and identifies that risks can propagate across layers from inputs to ecosystem impacts.
This work categorizes seven risks of OpenClaw for non-technical users, provides plain-language mitigations, and supplies a companion Skill to automate security configurations.
A survey that categorizes threats to OpenClaw agents including skill poisoning and cognitive manipulation and reviews defense mechanisms.
A systematic review of resource consumption threats in LLMs that organizes the problem along the full pipeline from threat induction to mitigation.
citing papers explorer
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When Claws Remember but Do Not Tell: Stealthy Memory Injection in Persistent Personal Agents
A trained attack model generates single emails that silently inject false memories into persistent AI agents, achieving 87.5% end-to-end success on GPT-5.4 and transferring across architectures and memory backends.
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Red-Teaming Agent Execution Contexts: Open-World Security Evaluation on OpenClaw
DeepTrap automates discovery of contextual vulnerabilities in OpenClaw agents via trajectory optimization, showing that unsafe behavior can be induced while preserving task completion and that final-response checks are insufficient.
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When Routine Chats Turn Toxic: Unintended Long-Term State Poisoning in Personalized Agents
Routine user chats can unintentionally poison the long-term state of personalized LLM agents, causing authorization drift, tool escalation, and unchecked autonomy, as measured by a new benchmark and reduced by the StateGuard defense.
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Mind Your HEARTBEAT! Claw Background Execution Inherently Enables Silent Memory Pollution
Claw AI agents' heartbeat background execution shares memory context with user sessions, allowing ordinary social misinformation to silently pollute long-term memory and shape behavior at rates up to 76% across sessions.
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BraveGuard: From Open-World Threats to Safer Computer-Use Agents
BraveGuard trains guard models on realistic agent trajectories derived from open-world threats, raising detection accuracy on AgentHazard from 38.79% to 82.38%.
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Security Attack and Defense Strategies for Autonomous Agent Frameworks: A Layered Review with OpenClaw as a Case Study
The survey organizes security threats and defenses in autonomous LLM agents into four layers and identifies that risks can propagate across layers from inputs to ecosystem impacts.
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Understanding and mitigating the risks of OpenClaw for non-technical users: A practical guide with Skill
This work categorizes seven risks of OpenClaw for non-technical users, provides plain-language mitigations, and supplies a companion Skill to automate security configurations.
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Security of OpenClaw Agents: Fundamentals, Attacks, and Countermeasures
A survey that categorizes threats to OpenClaw agents including skill poisoning and cognitive manipulation and reviews defense mechanisms.
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Resource Consumption Threats in Large Language Models
A systematic review of resource consumption threats in LLMs that organizes the problem along the full pipeline from threat induction to mitigation.