A proof that if states are merged when their optimal Q-values are close, the Nash equilibrium of the abstracted zero-sum Markov game has a duality gap bounded by O(ε/(1−γ)^3).
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Approximate State Abstraction for Markov Games
A proof that if states are merged when their optimal Q-values are close, the Nash equilibrium of the abstracted zero-sum Markov game has a duality gap bounded by O(ε/(1−γ)^3).