In Bayesian valid and basic utility games, the strategy representability gap is 1-1/e for independent priors and Θ(1/√n) for correlated priors, yielding price of anarchy and stability bounds that differ across mediated equilibrium concepts.
The participant selects a task ai ∈ Aθi i , where Aθi i ⊆ E is the set of feasible tasks for type θi
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
fields
cs.GT 1years
2025 1verdicts
ACCEPT 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
The power of mediators: Price of anarchy and stability in Bayesian games with submodular social welfare
In Bayesian valid and basic utility games, the strategy representability gap is 1-1/e for independent priors and Θ(1/√n) for correlated priors, yielding price of anarchy and stability bounds that differ across mediated equilibrium concepts.