Rising skill premiums drive unique asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric marriage market model, causing one gender to invest more in skills than the other.
International Journal of game theory , volume=
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Pricing, matching, and bundling act as complementary levers that platforms can adjust to balance their own profitability against overall market welfare in equilibrium.
citing papers explorer
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Skill Premia and Pre-Marital Investments in Marriage Markets
Rising skill premiums drive unique asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric marriage market model, causing one gender to invest more in skills than the other.
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Pricing, Matching, and Bundling: an Equilibrium Analysis of Online Platforms
Pricing, matching, and bundling act as complementary levers that platforms can adjust to balance their own profitability against overall market welfare in equilibrium.