Optimal mechanisms use linear payments with value sharing, allocate to the highest virtual surplus bidder, and generate more seller revenue when the seller is the pivotal collaborator.
Econometrica , volume =
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Non-affine approval functions create unavoidable miscalibration in proper scoring rules for strategic agents, but step-function thresholds enable first-best screening without it, uniquely for the Brier score.
citing papers explorer
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Optimal linear-payment auction design with aftermarket collaboration
Optimal mechanisms use linear payments with value sharing, allocate to the highest virtual surplus bidder, and generate more seller revenue when the seller is the pivotal collaborator.
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The Endogeneity of Miscalibration: Impossibility and Escape in Scored Reporting
Non-affine approval functions create unavoidable miscalibration in proper scoring rules for strategic agents, but step-function thresholds enable first-best screening without it, uniquely for the Brier score.