Reformulates non-convex CPT lottery design as a three-level optimization problem, characterizes the optimum, and supplies a linear-time algorithm for the seller's profit-maximizing lottery.
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A novel transformation upgrades single-buyer reserve pricing algorithms to the multi-buyer strategic setting, yielding O(log log T) strategic regret.
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Optimal design of lottery with cumulative prospect theory
Reformulates non-convex CPT lottery design as a three-level optimization problem, characterizes the optimum, and supplies a linear-time algorithm for the seller's profit-maximizing lottery.
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Reserve Pricing in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Strategic Bidders
A novel transformation upgrades single-buyer reserve pricing algorithms to the multi-buyer strategic setting, yielding O(log log T) strategic regret.