Adapts the Extensive-Form Double Oracle algorithm to indefinite-horizon adversarial graph traversal games with two-sided incomplete information, proves finite termination to an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, and uses Value of Information to characterize deceptive equilibrium behaviors.
Xdo: A double oracle algorithm for extensive-form games
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Deception and Counter Deception in Adversarial Graph Traversal Game
Adapts the Extensive-Form Double Oracle algorithm to indefinite-horizon adversarial graph traversal games with two-sided incomplete information, proves finite termination to an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, and uses Value of Information to characterize deceptive equilibrium behaviors.