LLM societies in Nomic show non-monotonic collective adaptation peaking at mid-scales, with smaller models rule-inert and larger ones restrictive.
Game theory meets large language models: A survey
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LLM agents make collective belief dynamics programmable, with simulations showing coordinated agents induce stable belief shifts, and four structural properties that complicate detection and defense.
LLMs converge on competitive rationality and coordination but diverge 48-fold on cooperation, with provider identity and generational shifts as dominant factors across 38 games.
Role-based personas in multi-agent LLM systems suppress payoff-aligned behavior, shifting equilibrium selection by up to 90 percentage points in Tragedy of the Commons versus Green Transition scenarios even with full payoff information.
citing papers explorer
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Scale-Dependent Collective Adaptation in Self-Amending LLM Societies: A Cross-Family Study of Emergent Governance
LLM societies in Nomic show non-monotonic collective adaptation peaking at mid-scales, with smaller models rule-inert and larger ones restrictive.
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LLM Agents Make Collective Belief Dynamics Programmable: Challenges and Research Directions
LLM agents make collective belief dynamics programmable, with simulations showing coordinated agents induce stable belief shifts, and four structural properties that complicate detection and defense.
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Large language models converge on competitive rationality but diverge on cooperation across providers and generations
LLMs converge on competitive rationality and coordination but diverge 48-fold on cooperation, with provider identity and generational shifts as dominant factors across 38 games.
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When Identity Overrides Incentives: Representational Choices as Governance Decisions in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
Role-based personas in multi-agent LLM systems suppress payoff-aligned behavior, shifting equilibrium selection by up to 90 percentage points in Tragedy of the Commons versus Green Transition scenarios even with full payoff information.