With adaptive costly audits and a flagging rule, a repeated non-monetary allocation mechanism achieves O(K^2) social-welfare regret and O(K^3 log T) expected audits for heterogeneous strategic agents, despite the planner having no prior distributional information.
Algorithmic fairness and vertical equity: Income fairness with irs tax audit models
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
fields
cs.GT 1years
2025 1verdicts
CONDITIONAL 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits
With adaptive costly audits and a flagging rule, a repeated non-monetary allocation mechanism achieves O(K^2) social-welfare regret and O(K^3 log T) expected audits for heterogeneous strategic agents, despite the planner having no prior distributional information.