Permissive Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria with bounded main and retaliation penalties in multiplayer reachability games are decidable in PSPACE under unary-encoded penalty bounds.
If there exists ρ∈⟨ Θ↾h⟩v such that Gaini(hρ) = 0, then any strategy profileσ ≲ Θ such that⟨σ↾h⟩v =ρ and⟨σ↾hv⟩u′ =ρ′ cannot be a very weak SPE
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Permissive Equilibria in Multiplayer Reachability Games
Permissive Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria with bounded main and retaliation penalties in multiplayer reachability games are decidable in PSPACE under unary-encoded penalty bounds.