In games with status-quo inertia, deleting or replacing actions shifts equilibria more reliably than price-based interventions.
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Multi-agent free-energy minimization under bounded rationality and local information yields approximate Nash equilibria, with cooperative games represented variationally as Gibbs distributions over coalitions and a free-energy version of the Harsanyi dividend for synergy.
citing papers explorer
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Changing the Game: Status-Quo Inertia, Institutional Design, and Equilibrium Transition
In games with status-quo inertia, deleting or replacing actions shifts equilibria more reliably than price-based interventions.
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A Collective Variational Principle Unifying Bayesian Inference, Game Theory, and Thermodynamics
Multi-agent free-energy minimization under bounded rationality and local information yields approximate Nash equilibria, with cooperative games represented variationally as Gibbs distributions over coalitions and a free-energy version of the Harsanyi dividend for synergy.