In Candidate Interval and Voter Interval domains, Pareto optimal committees admit a simple dominance characterization, satisfy monotonicity, allow direct reconfiguration, and support polynomial algorithms for proportionality and counting.
Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
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Price systems explain approval-based multiwinner voting by modeling voter influence via budgets spent on approved candidates, supported by axioms and a polynomial-time continuous-influence rule that satisfies jointly satisfiable properties.
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Pareto Optimality in Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting
In Candidate Interval and Voter Interval domains, Pareto optimal committees admit a simple dominance characterization, satisfy monotonicity, allow direct reconfiguration, and support polynomial algorithms for proportionality and counting.
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Explanation Systems for Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting
Price systems explain approval-based multiwinner voting by modeling voter influence via budgets spent on approved candidates, supported by axioms and a polynomial-time continuous-influence rule that satisfies jointly satisfiable properties.