In scheduling games with linear time-dependent job lengths, delay-averse jobs always admit efficiently computable pure Nash equilibria while non-delay-averse jobs may lack equilibria whose existence is NP-complete to decide even on identical machines; new policies achieve constant price-of-anarchy.
Title resolution pending
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
fields
cs.GT 1years
2026 1verdicts
UNVERDICTED 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Job-Scheduling Games with Time-Dependent Processing Times
In scheduling games with linear time-dependent job lengths, delay-averse jobs always admit efficiently computable pure Nash equilibria while non-delay-averse jobs may lack equilibria whose existence is NP-complete to decide even on identical machines; new policies achieve constant price-of-anarchy.