For any prior, a receiver can commit to a randomized action policy that induces truthful signaling from all senders while achieving the receiver's maximum possible payoff.
Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Pith papers citing it
abstract
We study Bayesian Persuasion with multiple senders who have access to conditionally independent experiments (and possibly others). Senders have zero-sum preferences over information revealed. We characterize when any set of states can be pooled in equilibrium and when all equilibria are fully revealing. The state is fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if sender utility functions are `globally nonlinear'. With two states, this is equivalent to some sender having nontrivial preferences. The upshot is that `most' zero-sum sender preferences result in full revelation. We explore what conditions are important for competition to result in such stark information revelation.
fields
cs.GT 2years
2026 2representative citing papers
Competing sellers' optimal advertising in a sequential-search market can be certified via constructed dual variables; symmetric equilibria have a hinge-convex structure.
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Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information
For any prior, a receiver can commit to a randomized action policy that induces truthful signaling from all senders while achieving the receiver's maximum possible payoff.
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Competing sellers' optimal advertising in a sequential-search market can be certified via constructed dual variables; symmetric equilibria have a hinge-convex structure.