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SIGY: Breaking Intel SGX Enclaves with Malicious Exceptions & Signals

1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.

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abstract

User programs recover from hardware exceptions and respond to signals by executing custom handlers that they register specifically for such events. We present SIGY attack, which abuses this programming model on Intel SGX to break the confidentiality and integrity guarantees of enclaves. SIGY uses the untrusted OS to deliver fake hardware events and injects fake signals in an enclave at any point. Such unintended execution of benign program-defined handlers in an enclave corrupts its state and violates execution integrity. 7 runtimes and library OSes (OpenEnclave, Gramine, Scone, Asylo, Teaclave, Occlum, EnclaveOS) are vulnerable to SIGY. 8 languages supported in Intel SGX have programming constructs that are vulnerable to SIGY. We use SIGY to demonstrate 4 proof of concept exploits on webservers (Nginx, Node.js) to leak secrets and data analytics workloads in different languages (C and Java) to break execution integrity.

fields

cs.CR 1

years

2025 1

verdicts

REJECT 1

representative citing papers

Towards Anonymous Neural Network Inference

cs.CR · 2025-05-23 · reject · novelty 5.0

funion applies Echomix's Pigeonhole storage and BACAP capabilities to run neural network inference through a store-compute-store pipeline, claiming sender-receiver unlinkability inherited from the mixnet.

citing papers explorer

Showing 1 of 1 citing paper.

  • Towards Anonymous Neural Network Inference cs.CR · 2025-05-23 · reject · none · ref 29 · internal anchor

    funion applies Echomix's Pigeonhole storage and BACAP capabilities to run neural network inference through a store-compute-store pipeline, claiming sender-receiver unlinkability inherited from the mixnet.