In games with status-quo inertia, deleting or replacing actions shifts equilibria more reliably than price-based interventions.
Title resolution pending
3 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
3
Pith papers citing it
verdicts
UNVERDICTED 3representative citing papers
Multi-agent free-energy minimization under bounded rationality and local information yields approximate Nash equilibria, with cooperative games represented variationally as Gibbs distributions over coalitions and a free-energy version of the Harsanyi dividend for synergy.
Proposes a probabilistic framework for latent agentic substructures in DNNs using log-score utilities and log pooling, with proofs on unanimity and an application to persona emergence in LLM alignment.
citing papers explorer
-
Changing the Game: Status-Quo Inertia, Institutional Design, and Equilibrium Transition
In games with status-quo inertia, deleting or replacing actions shifts equilibria more reliably than price-based interventions.
-
A Collective Variational Principle Unifying Bayesian Inference, Game Theory, and Thermodynamics
Multi-agent free-energy minimization under bounded rationality and local information yields approximate Nash equilibria, with cooperative games represented variationally as Gibbs distributions over coalitions and a free-energy version of the Harsanyi dividend for synergy.
-
Probabilistic Modeling of Latent Agentic Substructures in Deep Neural Networks
Proposes a probabilistic framework for latent agentic substructures in DNNs using log-score utilities and log pooling, with proofs on unanimity and an application to persona emergence in LLM alignment.