Randomized truthful auctions can restore truthful bidding by learning agents and strictly outperform second-price auctions with reserves, with auctioneer regret roughly T^(3/4) for fixed auctions and roughly sqrt(T) for scheduled ones.
Available at SSRN 4227229 (2022)
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Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agents
Randomized truthful auctions can restore truthful bidding by learning agents and strictly outperform second-price auctions with reserves, with auctioneer regret roughly T^(3/4) for fixed auctions and roughly sqrt(T) for scheduled ones.