Optimal mechanisms for procuring hard computational work in adversarial blockchains incur loss scaling logarithmically with liveness-fault cost, with equilibria that designate one random primary worker and a committee fallback.
2026.Phase 0 – The Beacon Chain.https://github.com/ethereum/ consensus-specs/blob/master/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md
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Adversarial procurement in blockchains
Optimal mechanisms for procuring hard computational work in adversarial blockchains incur loss scaling logarithmically with liveness-fault cost, with equilibria that designate one random primary worker and a committee fallback.