Losing contracts, committing players to self-utility loss upon defection, induce unique strong Nash equilibrium at joint cooperation in finite n-player Prisoner's Dilemmas with ordered strategies and extend to certain public goods games.
Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
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Preplay Losing Contracts: Inducing Strong Nash Equilibrium in the $n$-player Prisoner's Dilemma
Losing contracts, committing players to self-utility loss upon defection, induce unique strong Nash equilibrium at joint cooperation in finite n-player Prisoner's Dilemmas with ordered strategies and extend to certain public goods games.